LAHORE, Jan 1: The Muttahida Qaumi Movement will hold talks with ARD leaders in Karachi on Tuesday, and will then decide whether or not it should continue its affiliation with the multi-party coalition.
MQM leader Aftab Shaikh told Dawn on Monday that his party would discuss with the ARD its point of view on the question of provincial autonomy and extra-judicial killings of MQM supporters and workers carried out during the PPP and PML governments.
He said the PPP would be asked to explain its position with respect to press reports that it was holding talks with the government. "We'll not agree to serve as a stepping stone for any party to come to power. We'll not like to be used by any party," he said.
Mr Shaikh said his party had a specific position on the quantum of provincial autonomy which it could not compromise. He said parties with "dissimilar" views on various issues could not go together.
The MQM leader said after the Tuesday talks, he would report the outcome to the party's coordination committee which was competent to take a decision on the future course of action.
The ARD delegation which will meet MQM leaders at Nine-Zero includes Makhdoom Amin Faheem and Asfandyar Wali.
Meanwhile, acting Punjab PML Secretary-General Khwaja Saad Rafiq has criticized MQM leader Altaf Husain for his 'anti-Pakistan' utterances.
In a press statement, he said the PML leadership should take serious notice of the utterances, and in case the PML was to continue its struggle from a joint platform, the MQM would have to stop its abusive language and talks against the Pakistan ideology.
He alleged that Mr Husain wanted to create intellectual confusion in the country. The MQM wanted to drive the Urdu-speaking people of Karachi away from mainstream politics, he said.
The PML leader said Mr Husain claimed to be a champion of the middle classes, but he had dealt a serious blow to the politics of the very same people.
Maulana Qasmi's death condoled
KARACHI: Ulema Council
of Pakistan has expressed its deep regret over the demise
of Maulana Zia-ul-Haq Qasmi, Chairman Supreme Council of
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. In a joint statement religious
scholars, including Maulana Muhammad Asad Thanvi, Maulana
Asfandyar Khan, Maulana Aziz-ur-Rahman Thanvi, Dr Abdul
Razzaq Sikandar, Maulana Manzoor Ahmad Chinioti, Dr
Muhammad Khalid Soomro, said Maulana Qasmi had devoted
his entire life towards promoting the cause of Islam and
sanctity of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAWS). They also
remembered his efforts for establishing Islamic system in
the country. Maulana Abdul Majeed Nadeem, Mufti
Nizamuddin Shamzi, Maulana Syed Ata Bukhari, Maulana
Fazal Karim, Qazi Asmatullah and many of the other
colleagues of late Maulana Qasmi, paying glowing tributes
to the departed soul, said the contribution made for the
cause of Muslim Ummah could never be forgotten.
Defective strategy led to 1971 fiasco: Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report's disclosure
ISLAMABAD, Jan 1: The Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report cites professional incompetence, defective defence strategy, lack of coordination among army, navy and air force and moral degeneration
of the military high command as major reasons for the 1971 debacle.
A cursory glance at the selected portions of the report, declassified on Dec 30, reveals that the generals, the high command in particular, played havoc, though politicians had also mishandled the situation that led to the dismemberment of East Pakistan.
Talking about the defence plans, the report said: "we find that plans for the defence of Pakistan were formulated by the then services in practical isolation from each other, no use having been made by Gen Yahya of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and the Joint Chiefs Committee for evolving an integrated and coordinated plan."
"Almost all the critical decisions were taken by Gen Yahya or the GHQ without the matter being examined by the machinery which, undoubtedly, existed for the higher direction of war. The only exception was in the case of Air Marshal Rahim Khan, Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Air Force, who was brought into picture by the GHQ while planning the army offensive.
The report revealed that the plan formulated by the commander Eastern Command was approved by the GHQ without noticing that it suffered from the following major weaknesses/shortcomings:- i) It did not lay down a hypothetical tactical juncture at which the army must be withdrawn from the borders of East Pakistan to pre-determined lines of defence by deliberately surrendering certain areas, so that it could be re-deployed for the defence of Dacca in depth; ii) That the adoption of "fortress" concept carried with it the necessity to ensure that hard hitting reserve forces were placed behind the fortresses so as to influence the battle by punishing the enemy when it attempted to by-pass them; and iii) the plan did not cater for the contingency of withdrawal of the armed forces and west Pakistani personnel by land or sea to Burma in case East Pakistan was overrun by the enemy.
The commission observed that the GHQ also failed to examine the detailed plan for the defence of Dacca under the mistaken notion that this was a matter of detail to be sorted out by the Eastern Command with its lower formation concerned.
In view of the admitted vital importance of Dacca from military and political angles and the fact that the fall of Dacca was bound to mean the end of East Pakistan, it was incumbent upon the GHQ to guide, direct and influence the plan for the close defence of Dacca, but it (GHQ) failed to do so.
The master plan for the western border suffered from a serious weakness in as such as it did not spell out, in concrete terms, the time relationship with the Indian invasion of East Pakistan, nor did it clearly state the circumstances and factors which the commander-in-chief was to take into account in launching the army reserves. As a result, this most elaborate plan was liable to be thwarted by the indecisiveness of an individual, a disaster which actually occurred.
THREAT OF WAR: Talking about Indian threat of war vis-a-vis Pakistan's defence preparations, the commission said, in spite of clear threats of war and regular intelligence of Indian troop movements immediately outside the border and even of local skirmishes, we find to our utter surprise that the top army leadership including Gen Yahya and Gen Abdul Hamid stated that at no time did they expect open Indian intervention. "We cannot but regard this as another glaring example of Gen Yahya living in dream world of his own utterly divorced from realities."
"Against the ostrich like attitude of the then President was the other world of fantasy in which the so-called hawks were living," the commission observed, disclosing that during the course of the visit of the Pakistan delegation to China headed by Z A Bhutto, Pakistan was advised to avoid war and to use other methods of achieving a solution if possible.
"We have had good evidence that Air Marshal Rahim Khan, the then commander-in-chief of the air force, Lt-Gen Gul Hassan, chief of the army staff, were entirely averse to accepting this advice."
"Even with India having some of her troops engaged in the East Pakistan conflict and some others committed to defence against China, we were out-matched. In the event we have seen that our effort, if it can be called such, to relieve East Pakistan was futile. With the assumption of letting East Pakistan go we do not at all understand how we could have expected to defeat India in a war on the western front and with what object we should have fought such a war."
About the state of preparedness, the commission said: "It is to be regretted that we have not been able to find upon the evidence that there was any proper concept of manpower planning either within the armed services or at the national level." It is remarkable, the report adds, that even in the critical months after March 71, when war was clearly a probability if not a imminent certainty, the question seems to have bothered the general staff very little.
The commission put the major blame of the 1971 disaster on the ground forces and said that the army high command did not carry out any in-depth study of the affect of the new factors nor did it pay any attention to the growing disparity between the war preparedness and the capability of the armed forces of Pakistan and India as a result of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971.
The commission pointed out defects and deficiencies in defence plans, apart from the inadequacy of resources available on both fronts as compared to those of the enemy, which contributed to the sorry end.
About commander Eastern Command Gen Niazi, the report said, the tragedy with Gen Niazi had been his obsession that he would not be called upon to fight any major battle with the Indians in East Pakistan in spite of enormous Indian military build-up around East Pakistan.
Referring to statements of different witnesses, the commission said that the detailed narration of events clearly showed that the planning was hopelessly defective and there was no plan at all for the defence of Dacca, nor any concerted effort to stem the enemy onslaught with a division or a brigade battle at any stage.
Analysing the military aspect of the whole event, the commission concluded that senior army commanders had been guilty of serious dereliction of duty in formulating the defence plans and some are even guilty of shamefully abandoning the fortresses which it was their duty to defend. "We have also found that the commander East Command and his chief of staff Brig Baqir Siddiqi displayed wilful neglect in the matter of the execution of denial plans, with the result that large quantities of valuable materials, equipment, installations, arms and ammunition were delivered intact to the Indians at the time of surrender."
MORAL LAPSES: The commission also talked in length about the moral corruption among the senior military officers and revealed while the country was at the brink of division the military elite was busy in womanising.
The process of moral degeneration among the senior ranks of the armed forces, the commission assessed, was set in motion by their involvement in martial law duties in 1958. It added that these tendencies re-appeared and were in fact intensified when martial law was imposed once again by Gen Yahya.
The commission observed that there was indeed substance in the allegation that a large number of senior army officers had not only indulged in largescale acquisition of lands and houses and other commercial activities but also adopted highly immoral and licentious ways of life, which seriously affected their professional capabilities and their qualities of leadership.
"It appeared they had lost the will to fight and no longer possessed the ability to take vital and critical decisions demanded of them for the successful prosecution of the war," the commission said.
The report also carries the names of over 200 women who used to visit the then President Gen Yahya about whom the HRC said, "the most damaging allegation against the ex-President and commander-in-chief is that he was leading an extremely licentious life, devoting most of his time to wine and women."
"During the fateful days of the war, the general even stopped attending President office and did not visit the operation room in the GHQ on more than two to three occasions. General (Yahya) was addicted to heavy drinking and was extremely friendly with a numbers of ladies of indifferent repute who took lot of his time even during the critical days of the war and during the period immediately preceding the war."
Some of these ladies were Begum Shameen K N Hussain, wife of IGP East Pakistan; the begum of Junagadh; the famous singer Noor Jehan; Mst Aqleem Akhtar known as "General Rani", wife of a petty police official Raza; Nazli Begum, wife of a businessman of Karachi; Mrs Mansoor Hirjee; Mst Zainab, ex-wife of Maj-Gen (retd) Latif Khan; another Mst Zainab, ex-wife of Malik Sher Khizer Hayat Khan Tiwana; Mst Anwara Begum, an industrialist of Dacca; Mrs Lily Khan of Dacca; and Mst Laila Muzammil of Dacca.
During Nov 1971 when things were taking a serious turn in East Pakistan, the HRC said, the president spent two to three days at the Governor's House, Lahore, where Noor Jehan used to visit him two or three times daily and would also come to him at about 8pm every night.
About Gen Abdul Hamid Khan, the report said, it was indeed a national tragedy that it was not President alone who was afflicted with these things. "The evidence shows that his chief of staff Gen Abdul Hamid Khan was a frequent partner with him in many of these adventures. Frequently Gen Yahya and Gen Hamid would slip out to Gen Yahya's house in Harley Street, Rawalpindi, for the purpose of meeting some of their female friends."
The report also named Maj Gen Khudadad Khan among those who morally turned mindless animals. The report said that after the downfall of Gen Yahya, Mst General Rani was placed under detention by the government and interrogated at length. She had made several statements incriminating Gen Khudadad Khan who was last serving as Adjutant General of the Pakistan Army. Rani said apart from getting benefits from her relationship with Gen Yahya, she also took advantage of her friendship with Maj Gen Khudadad. She had also mentioned that some martial law cases were hushed up due to the intervention of the General. She had also referred to certain business deals in which financial benefits were reaped by this general.
About Lt -Gen A A K Niazi, the commission wrote that while posted as GOC Sialkot and later as GOC and corps commander at Lahore, Gen Niazi made lakhs of rupees in various transactions affecting the disposal of criminal cases brought under the martial law against smugglers and other criminals.
"The General was on intimate terms with one Mrs Saeeda Bukhari of Gulberg, Lahore, who was running a brothel under the name of "Senortia Home" where young women were residing in independent rooms. Another woman called Shameem Firdaus of Sialkot also playing the same role, was associated with Niazi," the report said.
Saeeda Bukhari used to visit Niazi even when he was posted to East Pakistan. Allegations were also levelled with regard to making money on the illicit import of Pans etc. from that province. It was known all over the town that Niazi was having a jolly good time late in the night.
"Niazi used to visit some bungalows in Dhan Mandi locality of Dacca. Even during Ramazan dancing girls were brought to a home for the pleasure of the Generals and corps commander. Niazi used to go to the houses of the dancing girls in his car bearing three stars and the official flags and "with all his paraphernalia," the report said.